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Speculum, Similitude, and Signification: 
the Incarnation as Exemplary and Proportionate 
Sign in the Arts of Ramon Llull1 
Introduction 
In this article I should like to examine cerlain aspects of Ramon Llull's use 
of the language of resemblance ("imatge," "figura," "semblanca"), specularity 
("mirall") and signification with respect to the Incarnation, in order to demon-
strate the pivolal role Christ plays in his thought. I should like to do this with 
particular reference to the minimisation of difference and contrariety, and the 
maximisalion of similitude and concordance, between God and man achieved 
by the Incarnation, although bearing in mind that Llull maintains at all times the 
distinclness of Persons in the Trinity as of natures in Christ and of the uncreated 
and the created (difference, concordance and contrariety making up the green 
triangle of Figure T during the Quaternary Phase and featuring strongly in Fig-
ure T of the Ternary Phase, in which latter the nine principles of this figure 
atlain full status as principles). 2 
' 1 should like to ihank Josep Maria Kuiz Sinion for reading earlier drafls of this article and for his 
valuablc comments, contributions, and criticisms thereon. I should also likc to thank Alexander Fidora 
for his aslutc comments upon the lext and for provision of bibliographical matcrial and information, and 
Yanis Dambcrgs for drawing a numbcr of Llulls writings to my attenlion, which I would havc othcrwisc 
overlooked. By "Arts", I mcan hcre as much those works in which the principles of the Arts find thcir 
application as the Arts proper. 
1 In Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, MOG I, vii, 32 (464), Llull discusses the reasons why all 
three Persons of the Trinity were not incarnatcd, concluding that thc difference in the Persons of God is 
better signilled if only one ol these assumed llesh, and that by greater differencc is signified greater con-
cordancc bctween thesc three Persons. This equation bctween the majority of difference and the niajority 
of concordance (between the Persons of the Trinity) cannot bc applicd in thc samc nianner, however, to 
the duality of natures in Christ; Llull is less concerned to equate difference and concordance between the 
divine and the human but ralher to show how the supreme concordance and similitude of these in Him 
can effccl the perfection of man and thc univcrsc consequent upon thc climination of all contraricty 
between God and creation. 
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Within thc Judaco-Christian tradition, of coursc, human nature is held to 
bear a fundamenlal similarity lo that of God, bcing created in His image and 
after His likcncss. Original Sin, therefore, the result of Adam's act of disobcdi-
ence towards God, alienates man from his creator to such an extent thal, for 
Chrislians at least, man's restitution can only be achieved through the willing 
self-sacrifice of God 's only son. And it is the nature of this very reslitution 
which preoccupies Llull so greatly from his first to his final works. Whether he 
conceives of this in terms of man's atonement or in terms of man's recovery of 
the glory promised him at creation or furthcr still in Christo- and theocentric 
tcrms as the finality of creation and as God's purpose, the issue of the degree of 
man's likeness to God and the proportion established in Christ between the 
human and the divine is always present. Nevertheless, Original Sin, that point of 
rupture, remains for Llull the occasion for that great, though accidental, differ-
ence and contrariety which has arisen between man and God, a difference and 
contrariety both of which arc perpetuated by a theory of the Incarnation which 
makes this latter dependenl upon that sin. 1 
Thc earlier part of Llulfs writing career was spent, as we might expect from 
a writer who recently had undergone a profound religious conversion, in consid-
erations regarding his personal atonement for past, actual sins, considerations 
regarding the universality of Original Sin, and considerations regarding Chrisfs 
personal and potentially universal atonement for the offence commit ted by 
Adam, the guilt for which was passed on to all his descendents in the form of a 
stain which brought with it passibility, corruptibility, mortality and death. 4 It 
' The functions of concordance and contrariety within Figure T are to provide the Artist with a gen-
eral or a particular answer, respectively, to any question. This might suggest that LlulPs preference for 
concordance over contrariety in this respect—dating from Liber de XIV articulis sacrosanctae Roinanae 
Catholicaefidei (1283-5?), in which Llull asserts (Distinction IV, part 2, § 6) that recreation stems from 
sin, although sin is not its cause. and thal it signifies the maxinial contrariety exisling between the Digni-
ties and sin, aftcr which point hc begins to emphasise the positive concordance between God and nian as 
established in and through Christ. MOG II, vi, 156 (576)—corresponds to a desire further to universalise 
the figure of Christ in the context of his broader aims of rendering his Arts more general. For a good gen-
eral analysis of the nature and function of "recreation" in some of LlulFs earlier works, see Perarnau i 
Espelt 2005. 10-14.31-35. 
' See Uibre del gentil e dels tres savis (1274-83), NEORL II, 117, 11. 53-6. The manner in which 
Llull construes Christ in his early works, naniely. as that most general being capable of saving man from 
general mortality and of removing the general guilt contracted as a result of generalised Original Sin, 
through the recreation effected by His Passion and Crucifixion, persists until after the turn of the century. 
However, the notion of Christ as a figure possessing at least as great a degree of generality as Original 
Sin, whereby He can fulfil His role as Recreator, undergoes a degree of change. to the extent that, taken 
in Himself, Christ comes to feature, in LlulPs eyes, as the most general creature on a purely onlological 
level, that is to say, in relative independence from a sustained consideration of His role in man's redemp-
tion. On the generality of Original Sin, see Llibre de conieinplacid en Deu (1273-4?), 183:1-30; 248:2, 
10-16, 25-6; Ars compendiosa inveniendi veriiatein (1274?). MOG I, vii, 13 (445); Liber de XIVarticulis 
SPECULUM, SIMILITUDE, AND SIGNIFICATION 5 
should be noled, in this respect, that Original Sin was vicwed by the Latin tradi-
tion—in contrast to the Byzantine—following Saints Augusline and Anselm, in 
quasi-juridical terms as a nigh-on infinite offence against God transmilted in a 
quasi-biological manner as inherited guilt. 5 
Thc language of LlulTs early-period Christological discourse, therefore, 
bears the inflection of Christ's humility and patience as revealed by (His Incar-
nation in human form and) His Passion, as well as of God's essential goodness 
and mercy towards man, as these are manifested externally in and through the 
Incarnation; all of which qualities feature among the structuring principles of 
the Arts of LlulFs Quaternary Phase. The basis for such inflection is LlulTs 
acute awareness of his own, and man's, estrangement from God, that is to say, 
man's accidental difference from and contrariety to God resulting from the Fall. 
Christ thus figures in this scheme as someone who might make, indeed has 
made, reparation for the sin committed by Adam, and yet who, also, through his 
obedience to God and love for man, manifested in the acute suffering of his Pas-
sion, presents mankind with a supreme example, by which man might avoid 
actual sin, and flnd reconciliation with his maker." 
sacrosanctae Romanae Catliolicae fidei (1283-57). MOG II, vi. 155-6 (575-6); on the fact that Christ's 
Incarnation and Passion do not recreale man's sensual or intellectual natures in this world but only on the 
Day of Judgcment, when they will be recreated in all who have failh in Chrisfs Incarnation, see Uibre de 
contemplacid (1273-4?), 248:28-29; on how the death suffered by Chrisfs body removes gcneralised 
guilt in the sensitive and vegetative powers, while the Passion of his soul removes guilt from the powers 
of meniory, intellect and will, through the conjunction of his power with that of the Son of God, see 
Liberde XIV articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae fidei (1283-5?), MOG II, vi, 182 (602); on the 
general niortality which is a consequence of generalised Original Sin, see Arbre de sciencia (1295-6), 
ORL XII, 96; ROL XXV, 474, 11. 1849-1857; on the generality of Original Sin and the satisfaclion made 
by the most general created being, God and nian, who, as Recreator has to be at least as general as Origi-
nal Sin, see Llibre dels articles de lafe (1296), NEORL III, 51, II. 95-100; on the role played by the gen-
erality of Chrisfs human nature in recreating the world, see Proverbis de Ramon (1296?), ORL XIV, 43; 
on why God was incarnated rather than angelified (namely. so that He could participate in all creatures 
through human flesh—"in homine factam generaliter"), see Contemplatio Raynmndi (August 1297), ORL 
XVIII, 403; on thc generality of thc restoration effected by Chrisfs Passion, see Llibre que deu hom 
creure de Deu (January 1302), NEORL III, 101,11. 111-14; ROL XXX, 169, II. 121-25; on the generality 
of the Resurrection, see NEORL III, 101, 11. 115-20; ROL XXX, 169, II. 126-32; Liber ad probandum 
aliquos articulos fidei catholicae per syllogisticas rationes or Liber de syllogismis (February 1304), ROL 
XX, Part VI. passim; and, mosl importantly, on Christ as that bcing with the greatest commonality, see 
Uibre que deu hom creure de Deu (January 1302), NEORL III, 99, II. 50-58. 
' For the Byzantine tradition, see Meyendorff 1974/1979, 145, 160-1; and Congar 1935, 94-7. See 
also Ricoeur 1974/2004. 265-82, especially 273-5 and 280-1. For LlulPs posilion with regard to these 
two traditions, see Hughes 2005, 281-96. 
'' It is also inleresting to nole how LlulTs repeated references, particularly at this stage of his writing 
career, to Chrisfs humility, patience, obedience and suffering, constitute a forceful appeal to thc reader's 
feclings of admiration and compassion. See also Ramon Llull, Proverbis de Rainon (1296?), ORL XIV, 
85, Part 1, Chapter 83, "De Exempli," sections 7 and 8, on "humilitat" and "pacicncia." rcspectively. 
Although these latter instances are a relatively late case of his recourse to such appeals, this work demon-
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Parallcl to this, however, we also find in LlulFs early wrilings, the emer-
gence of an increasingly potent discourse—along the theophanic lines so com-
mon among medieval Platonists—upon the manifestation of God 's essential 
altributes in creation, a discourse which indicates to Llull himself that, nol only 
does Christ have this negative role to play in the cosmos as its Recreator or 
Redeemer, but that also He might, in a positive sense, reinstitute the likeness or 
similitude between man and God which was offered to man at creation but 
which was deferred by Adam's sin. This likeness is essenlially the offer of a 
progressive deification initiated at baplism, continued throughout life in the 
practice of the sacraments and the exercise of the virtues, and culminating in 
beatitude in glory, though in a beatitude which can only ever approximate divine 
infinitude. 7 This parallel discourse, possibly under an Anselmian influence 
regarding notions of maximity, as well as under the direction of Neoplatonic 
ideas regarding the degrees of perfection of being in creation, a creation pro-
strates how, even a considerable time after Llull's endorsement of those positions consistent with a belief 
in thc primacy of Chrisl and. so, after he had begun to emphasise Chrisfs role as locus of an intersection 
between the two vectors of deification and hominification, along with those of injluentia and refluentia. 
he still adhercd to a strong belief in the redemptive function of ihe Incarnalion: "Ab incarnaeid e passio 
procura Deus nostra redempcid." ibid.. 97. See also Contemplatio Rayinundi (August 1297), ORL XVIII, 
404-5, in which there is an intense focus on the sufferings and humiliation undergone by Christ for the 
sake of man's salvation. Influeiiiia and reflueiuia are both defined among the Hundred Forms of U)gica 
nova (May 1303) as follows: "[i]nlluencia es abundancia de son primer, per so que aquell primcr puscha 
aver agencia," and "|r]efluencia es abslraccio de son primer, car en lo subjet en que fo enfiuxa a indigen-
cia," NEORL IV, 74; ROL XXIII, 92. II. 339-40 and 341-2. Until at least the late I280s, Llulls answer to 
the question of why actual evil should exist in a world which has already been restored through the Incar-
nation, takes the form, beyond a more general response explaining man's tendency towards non-being, of 
a lament over the fact that men have not followed Christ's example (particularly that of the Passion) to a 
greater degree. 
' In Liber de ascensu el descensu intellectus (March 1305), ROL IX, 157, such beatitude involves, 
Ihough not exclusively, the greatest of rewards granted to man's body in paradise. namely. thal he might 
see the body of Christ in glory. A proof of God's Incarnalion is, thus, construcled on Ihe basis of the 
maximity of the reward that God could grant to man's body. given the hypothesis of the Incarnation. In 
other words, God could not granl this greatest of awards in the absence of an Incamation. See also Liber 
praedicationis contra judaeos (August 1305), ROL XII, 61. For further discussion of the role of beatitude 
in Llull's thought, as ihis developed, see Ruiz Simon 2005. 174-8, where the author notes the influence 
of Proclean notions of causality upon LlulTs understanding of those similitudes which characterise the 
beatific vision in glory. For the existence of "a highly developed doctrine of deification" in the Latin 
West (in Aquinas' Sumina tlieologiae) even in the medieval period. see Willianis 1997. I. Williams also 
confirms the unily of sanctificalion in this life and consummation in the next implicit in my account, 
ibid., 2. Williams also points out Ihat ihe concepl of deification (in Aquinas) is articulated in the close 
relations existing between the doctrine of God (as a transccndent, independent Trinitarian being who 
nonetheless wishes His creatures to participate by grace and, ultimately, glory in His life) and theological 
anlhropology (the presence ol vestigia of the Trinity in man and all creation; the doctrine of the iinago 
Dei). ibid., 1, 4-7, 14-19, linked by a concept of love that brings "unily-in-distinction". ibid., n. 8 and 
text. The idea of an 'assimilation to God' or divinisation is already present in Plato, Tlteaeletus, I76b, 
and was quoted by Plotinus. 
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pelled by ihe desire to return to ils origins in the ultimate perfection of the pri-
mary category of Being, articulales LlulTs—and man ' s—own aspiration to 
attain a maximum, that is to say, a maximum of perfection or being. Chrisl, 
viewed in such positive terms, is that maximum, the very embodiment of divine 
perfections and of being in its purest created form: in his Deity he is hominified 
God; in his humanity, deified man. 
These latter features of Llull's thought, however, are the result of a deepening 
awareness of the degree lo which God's causality bears fruit in creation, particular-
ly in the form of His incarnated, only-begotten Son. This increased focus upon the 
manifestation of God's atlributes in creation, which reaches a mature expression in 
the early 1280s, and is later conceived to be the product of God's descending influ-
ence, is, however, completed by the notion of creation's own ascending refluence, 
through its signification of the Deity towards whom it is in the process of returning. 
It is also worth noting here the close links bctween Llull's thought in this respect 
and Franciscan notions of creation as God's self-manifestation, in which Christ fea-
tures as the plenary point of such manifestation. 
We must also take into account the fact that Llull conceived of the ends of 
the Incarnalion—whether the deification/hominification pair, Chrisfs perfection 
of the universe, his conjunction of the infinite and the finite, the recreation of 
man, Chrisfs suffcring and death, descent into Hell, bodily resurrection (or all 
combined)—as a form of signification (to the human intellect), indeed its exem-
plary form. And, in this, the human intellect—most complelcly and perfectly in 
Christ—operates as the privileged conduit through which signification might 
circulate fully, Christ being that sign required by God so that His influentia and 
man's refluentia might properly be signified. Llull's own definitions of signifi-
cation show that he intended this term to denote the revelation of secrets and thc 
rendering explicit of what was only implicit. 8 It would seem that signilicalion, 
therefore, bears a very close relationship lo the Incarnalion, particularly lo its 
finality or llnalitics, since what Llull progressively effects through his discourse 
upon the final causes of the Incarnation, is the revelation of its ultimate secrets, 
* Following a suggestion of Johnston's, Johnston 1987, 163, it would seeni that this movement from 
the iniplieit to the explicit bcars parallcls to the fonnal cause of the Greal Arts, namely the descent from 
the universal to the particular; Ihat is, from thc principlcs and thcir condilions lo the questions posed and 
the answers given. as well as to the movement from causc to effect and from ihe exemplar to thc example 
which participates in it. Johnston describes Llulls understanding of signification as being "the immediate 
perception of the universal in the particular or vice versa and [...] a necessary relational or eausal con-
nection, received in the mind as a first intention [i.e. a concepl] of the natures of things," ibid., 173. For 
Johnston's account of Llulls ideas upon signification, sce ibid., 162-75. For an earlier account ol LlulTs 
theory of signification and its relation to medieval speculative grammar, see Platzeck 1953-4, 35-49. For 
niore recent accounts. focusing upon LlulFs realist and materialist scmantic theories, see Vidal i Roca 
1990, 323-334, and Trias Mercanl 1993, Chapter 8, especially 99-107. 
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thc rendering explicit of its implicit truths, with respect both to creation and to 
God Himself. Thus Llull makes explicit the truths of deification and hominifica-
tion there implicit,'' and he reveals the secrets of the relationship between the 
Incarnation, God's greatest exlernal operation, and the Trinity, God's greatest 
internal operat ion, that is to say, their reciprocal speculari ty. The secrcts 
revealed and the truths made explicit by signification are secrets and truths sig-
nified to the human intellective soul, so that man might fulfil his first intention, 
and God His. 1" I will consider later in this article, therefore, how Llull conceptu-
alises the relationship of the Incarnation both to the Trinity, via his theory of 
signification, and to the issue of the perfect reciprocal love existing between 
God and man in Christ. 
For Llull, as a Christian Neoplatonist, created beings fulfil their purpose and 
are granted their consummation upon being united with the Good, thereby find-
ing repose in thc perfection of their kind. Through his application of such ideas, 
Llull shows that, in and through Jesus Christ, God influences, perfects or deifies 
creation to the maximal degree, such that His Dignities find repose in creation. 
Furthermorc, human nature is so ennobled as a result, that, through Christ 's 
example, man can "majorify," in turn, his positive response (or "refluence") 
towards the creator's beneficence and love, thus achieving repose in God's Dig-
nities for himself and for the entirety of creation. Llull, howevcr, does nol fail to 
make clear that, though initially, at least, one may apprehend Christ to be the 
supreme nexus between God's potentially infinite influentia and man's finite 
refluentia, the maximal sign of God's perfection (as well as of man's aspiration 
towards God), ultimately we should understand him as the conduit through 
which love flows in both directions, and as occupying first place in the order of 
God's wishes." 
" Hughes 2001. 11 l-l 15. It has been noted by Ruiz Simon 2005. 174-8, that Llull's underslanding of 
the beatific vision in glory (in olhcr words. the ultimate deification of man) may have been developed 
during the period of his "transilional works" of 1287-89 as a result of his reading of the corpus dionysi-
uciiin during his firsl stay in Paris (also 1287-89). 
'" Llull gives a number of definilions of "significacio," the majority of them emphasising that signili-
cation reveals thc secret or secrels bestowed upon and residing in a subject. It is defined in Li>gica nova 
(May 1303), NEORL IV, 75; ROL XXIII, 93, 11. 399-401, as follows: "Significacid es ens per Io qual 
secret es revelat. per so car significacid aleyn aquclles coses que intren al subject e yxen del subject." 
Johnston states that the final clause of this definilion refers lo accidenls of ihings, accidents by means of 
which the subject is known, Johnston 1987, 163. Although Llull states in the Liber de significatione 
(February 1304) ihat "significalio est ens, cui proprie pertinet significare," ROL X, 14, he also states ihal 
ihe aim of the Art of signification is "reducere significationes implicatas ad explicatas," ibid., 20. See 
also Bonner and Ripoll 2002, 271. Among the Hundred Forms included in Ldgica nova, "secret" is 
defined as "ombra de ignorancia del enleniment, qui no pot esser pratich ab ignorancia. E la rahd es quar 
entenimenl no pot aver alcuna participacio ab ignorancia," NEORL IV, 78; ROL XXIII, 95, II. 477-9 . 
" God's influence upon creation is only potentially infinile as created beings do not have the capaci-
ty to receive inlinitude. 
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Christ, for Llull, therefore, is the sine qua non in the absence of whose lncar-
nalion, Passion, Resurrection and Ascension, neither God nor man would be 
capable of fuliilling their respective tirst intentions or llnal causes and, thus, of 
achieving repose. ' 2 And if the divine end of the Incarnation were not superior to 
its human end, God's influentia as cause upon creation would be less than man's 
refluentia as effect and His first intenlion would be less perfectly signiiied in 
creation than man's. As a starting point for such considerations, I shall turn now 
to LlulFs treatmcnt of Christ's role as exemplary sign of the divine perfections, 
namely the unparalleled resemblance his human nature bears to the divinity of 
God, and the superlative (moral) example offered by Christ to mankind, in par-
ticular, by means of his Passion (the suffering of Chrisfs humanity during the 
Passion being a favoured theme among Franciscan writers)." 
'• Although Llull denies thal in God there is any division into first and second inlentions in Llibre 
dintencid (1274-83) (see Carreras y Artau 1939, I, 611. The passage in question states that "|e]n la 
enlencio de Deu no ha divisio de primcra e segona intencid on sia menoritat. quor tota sa intencid cs 
infinida e eternal: e per asso. fill no'y pot caber segona intencid," Liibre d'inlencid. ORL XVIII, 8-9. 
Eniphasis added.). Ruiz Simon has pointed out, in personal communications. that Llull explicitly attribut-
es afirst intention to God in both Disputatio fidelis et infidelis (1288-89) and Disputacid de cinc savis 
(1294). In the former work, Llull states that "...ergo iste Homo. qui est Creatura summe perfecta ratione 
deitalis est ultima Finis et Summa Perfectio omnium creaturarum, ergo ad eum sunt creata omnia, tan-
quam ad suum ultimuni Fincm," MOG IV, vi, 26 (402). Ruiz Simon comments ihal, although Llull does 
not, in fact, use the terms "first" and "second intentions" here. he is calling upon the definition of these 
terms as given in Art demostrativa: "La primera intencio es la causa final, e la segona es co qui s'ha a la 
fi," Art demostrativa, OS I, 375; in the Dispulacid de cinc savis. Llull also states that "La II per quc cs 
encarnatio es per so que Deus sia home e aquesta es la primcra cntencid e la pus principal per que Deus 
es encarnat. E la segona entencio es per so que home sia Deu e aquesta segona entencid es primera 
segons comparatid de la redemptio del human gendre. la qual redemptid es per la segona entencio." Dis-
putacid de cinc savis. ATCA 5, 75. Ruiz Simon has madc the further suggcslion that, prior to LlulTs 
changc to a ternary system, Christ is viewed by Llull as thc final cause of creation in the contcxt of man's 
first intcntion: and, as a result of the transitional period before 1289 and their contribution to the reformu-
lation of the Art, He is viewed subsequently as the final cause of creation in the context of God's first 
intention. thc order of His influentia and of His deification of reality. Thus Llull would be found to 
progress from an earlier focus upon creation's repose in God to a later foeus upon God's repose in cre-
ation. 
" As is shown in Proverbis de Ramon (1296?), for example,—though, in this case. without reference 
lo the Passion—where Llull states that "le]n la humanilal de Jhesu Crist ha major excmplar de les divines 
raons, que en neguna altra creatura," and, fuilhcr, that "]s]oI Jhesu Crist esta centre de complit exempli," 
ORL XIV, 84-85. In the same chapter, Llull also claims that Chrisfs supreme moral example is manifest-
ed to man through His goodness and love, neither of which can be rivalled in the created realm. Llull 
offers Christ (and his Passion) as a moral example and subject of devotion to what must be, exclusively, 
a Chrislian readership, until around 1289. However, as the first quotation illustrates, he expresses very 
definite ideas not only regarding man's corporeal and spiritual ascent as driven by Christ's moral exam-
ple, but also regarding the manner in which Christ's human nature signifies the very descent of the 
"divines raons" into creation. a conception carrying a morc broadly ecumenical appeal. 
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1. Christ as Sign, Similitude, and Exemplar; C h r i s f s Example of Martyr-
dom in the Passion 1 4 
It is widely recognised that ideas of imagc and likeness, spccifically the 
image and likeness of God in which, according to the Old Testamcnt, man was 
created, were ccntral to Judaeo-Chr i s t i an concep t ions of the re la t ionship 
between divinity and humanity and were "perhaps the single most important 
element of patristic anlhropology". 1* It is perhaps less well known, however, that 
certain Church Falhers insisted upon a qualitative distinction betwecn the image 
and the likeness of God as granted to and embodied by man. 1 6 M. J. Edwards 
defines this distinction as follows: "The former, which is held to be indefeasiblc, 
is the powcr of rational choicc that makes us persons and enables calloused sin-
ners to cooperate with God in thcir salvation. Thc likcness or simililude, on the 
other hand, though promised at the outset, was not vouchsafed to Adam at the 
moment of creation, or at least not in such measure as to barricadc his soul 
against temptation." 1 7 The author goes on to state, this time with implicit refer-
" Johnslon suggcsts thal Llull underslands the term "sign" in a way which places "any logical, nieta-
physical, or physical relationship" (emphasis added) within the semiotic order, Johnston 1987, 54. Dis-
cussing LlulPs use ofthe Aristotelian Categories in his early works and the contribution of the fonner to 
"the long-standing medieval difficulty regarding the conception of Logic as an ars sermocinalis or an ars 
realis," ibicl., 63,—that is to say, regarding the queslion of whether the Calegories have a real or merely 
verbal value—, Johnston describes LlulPs "natural Logic," ibid., 64, as providing the "hcrmeneutic 
analysis" which is signilication, ibid. 
" Citation from Williams 1997, 15. Genesis I: 26, "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our iniage, 
after our likeness...' " or "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similtudinem nostram". Llull cites this 
auctoritas in the context of his development of rational and necessary proofs of scriptural quotations in 
his Liber de praedicatione (1304), ROL III, 402-3; also cited in Bonner 2005, 63. These ideas were also 
instrumental in the development of Renaissance ideas pertaining to the dignity of Man, see Trinkaus 
1973-4, passim. Trinkaus points to the Neoplatonic and Patristic origins of the idea that "[m]an's dignity 
lay in his creation in the image and likeness of God, which could be inlerpreled as meaning [...] thal it 
was man's desliny lo transcend the limitations of the image-likeness and to ascend to eventual deification 
by a progress toward perfect assimilation of image and model, [...]", ibid., 144. For an indication of 
aulhors from the «School of Chartres» expressing such ideas as well as of writers oulside Ihe more slrict-
ly Neoplatonic circles, see ibid., 139-40. 
"Lossky 1957, 114-27; also Williams 1997, 15. 
" Edwards 2002, 102. Trinkaus 1973-4, 137, comments that, for the early Greek Fathers, such as 
Clement of Alexandria. Origen, Basil and Grcgory of Nyssa, man's "similitude" or likeness to God 
(lioiuoiosis in the words of the Septuagint) "connoted the dynamic process of becoming like God, or Pla-
tonic 'assimilation' " while his being created in God's "image" indicated his pre-lapsarian state of perfec-
tion. However, for the view prcvalenl among both Patristic and Latin (medieval) authors, wilh the notable 
exceptions of Augusline and Aquinas, that man"s recreated stale—after its reformatio in meliore—was 
superior to thc state in which his nalure was firsl created, sec Thunbcrg 1985, 60; Hughes 2005, 289. 
Aquinas, in Siiinma theologiae I, q. 33, a. 3, speaks of three kinds (or degrees) of similitude: of image, of 
grace, and of glory, cited in Willianis 1997, 8. We should nole thal Llull progressively slales, from a very 
early stage, that: a) Ihe union of natures in Chrisl has returned the entire human race to its prelapsarian 
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ence to the deification of man and the deilication of Chr is fs humanity, thal 
"[ojnce sin has enlered the citadel of reason, the assimilation of man to God 
through virtue was impossible without a manifestation of thc likeness [viz. 
man's likeness to God] through the infallible humanity of Christ."1* According 
to Origen (AD 185-254), possibly the iirst expositor of St. Irenaeus of Lyons (fl. 
180) with whom the distinction is generally held to originate, the verses from 
the Old Testament, namely Genesis I: 26-8, connote that "whereas man has 
obtained the image in the dignity of our first condition, the perfection of the 
likeness is laid up for him only at the consummation." 1 ' ' Though the image may 
not have been forfeited as a result of Adam's Fall, it appears that man's likeness 
to God, a property of both body and soul, has been lost or deferred, at the very 
least; it is only through the Incarnation of Christ that this likeness or similitude 
can be restored, in part through his Incarnation, Passion, and Ressurection, and 
in part through mankind's imitation of the exemplary God-man.'" 
As has been pertinently noted, however, in the case of Thomas Aquinas, this 
doctrine of the imago Dei is not necessarily used by Latin authors in the same 
manner as by their Patristic forebears. Aquinas is said to consider not the theo-
logical bearing of this doctrine upon this life or upon human nature as it had 
been intended prior to the Fall, but rather upon how mankind is ordered towards 
his end. Williams states that, instead of indicating the price paid for Adam's sin 
or the degree of man's forfeiture, "[t]he imago Dei theology lells us primarily 
what we will be, not what we a re 'V 
state of purity (Llibre de coniemplacio (1273-4?), 85:15); and b) the work of recreation exceeds Uiat of 
creation on God's part; but that c) the manifestation of God's attributes is itself superior to the hypothe-
sis of recreation (Llibre de demostracions (1274-6), ORL XV, 582). Points b) and c) would seem to be 
associated, therefore, with the restoration of God's image in man but also the initiation of a positive and 
progressive reinstitution of man's similitude to God. See Hughes 2005, 289-90. 
1 8 Edwards 2002, 102. 
'" Origen, First Principles 3.6.1; P. Koetschau, Origenes Werke. De Principiis. Leipzig: GCS 22. 
1913, V, 280, cited in and translated by Edwards 2002, 102. See also Ruiz Simon's discussion of the role 
of Genesis I: 26-8 in Llulfs efforts to relate the essential conslitution of the human soul (on the basis of 
likenesses or similitudes) with man's creation in the image and after the likeness of God. in Ruiz Simon 
2005, 173. n. lOandtext. 
: o Gaya links the concept of imago with the spiritual nature of man while associating that of ves-
tigium (lit. footprint) with a range of views articulated by Aquinas and Bonaventure among others. Gen-
erally speaking, Gaya views man's vesiigium as the means by which he might attain partial (demonstra-
live) knowledge of God, the highest form of which is knowledge per contemplationem, namely the con-
lemplation of crcation which. being like unlo God, offers significations and dcmonstralions of Him, Gaya 
1995, 481-3. Trinkaus 1973-4, 138, states that for Augustine, at least, "the Fall was interpreled as seri-
ously and sevcrely corrupling the 'image' of God in man but not cntircly obliterating it, whereas man's 
simililude, which lay in his capacity lo perform virtues, was entirely lost until restored by the divine 
grace of the Atonement". As a result of his interpretation of Genesis I: 26. Augustine saw vesligia of the 
Iriune God in creation. man posscssing this imagc in thc Iriadic slructure of the intellective soul. 
•'' Williams 1997, 15. 
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Not surprisingly, Ramon Llull frequenliy has recourse lo such tcrms as 
"imatge i figura," "mirall," and "semblanca," in his characterisation of Jesus 
Christ, the ultimate reflection of the immanence and agency of God in creation, 
the ultimate point of reference for God's influence upon creation's chief repre-
sentative (mankind), the principal locus of created perfection and the foremost 
source and embodiment of the world's return to its superabundant divine cause. 
LlulFs use of these terms, however, carries a distinct flavour and is employed 
within the context of a broadly Neoplatonic project. Gaya has already shown 
that signification is the mediating relationship between a "figure" and reality, 
and that it is frequently expressed by Llull in terms of the example of the mirror 
("mirall")." Gaya informs us that Llull relates the function of the mirror to the 
manner in which sensory things signify and demonstrate to man their intellectu-
al counterparts. ' 1 Bonner and Ripoll have also recently gathered together Llulfs 
own definitions of many of these terms. 2 4 Similarly, Ruiz Simon has provided a 
detailed analysis of the role played by divine likenesses or similitudes in the 
replacement of the essences of the four elements as the fundamental principles 
of the sublunary world. 2 5 
Gaya explains, at the end of his article, that man's initial knowledge of reali-
ty comes to him through certain "figures" presented by his sensory perceptions. 
Man perceives in these figures, properties and qualities that signify real objccts 
which must be analysed in terms of logic and metaphysics in order to enable an 
asccnt from the sensory to the intellectual realm. Demonstration constilutes, on 
the one hand, an explanalion of these propertics and qualities insofar as they 
define the perceived object, and, on the other, a confirmation of the existence of 
other realities outside the range of sensory perception, but asserted as articles of 
faith. Gaya thus makes a sustained attempt to illustrate the importance of the 
comprehension of faith for the Illuminaled Doctor. According to Gaya's read-
ing, therefore, to consider Christ as "imatge i figura" would be to consider him 
with respect to the sensitive and inlellective (or spirilual) orders exclusively; 
° Gaya 1995, 483-90. The etymology of the word speculum combines the senses of reflection and 
contemplalion, and it is in both these senses that the human intelleclive soul is said by Llull lo be or to 
act as a mirror: a means by which the intellect might have indirect access to the divine truths (the Trinily) 
and might contemplate these, while existing as their image and reflection. For Gregory of Nyssa's view 
of the soul as a mirror by means of which man can see and know God in himself and ultimately achieve 
deification. see Trinkaus 1973-4, 137. 
" Gayii 1995, 490. Il is clearly in ihis sense that the inearnated Chrisl functions, even al the level of 
his corporeality. as a mirror wilh respecl to the Trinity, although, as we will see, the Trinity, itself the 
highest category of Being, also functions reciprocally as a reflection of Christ. 
! J Bonner and Ripoll 2002, s.v. "Demonstratio", "Figura", "Mirall | Speculum", "Semblansa, sem-
blanca | Similitudo", and "Signifieacid | Significatio". For "ligura", "imaginar and imatge" (or "ymagi-
nar" and "ymatge"), and "semblanca", see also Colom Mateu 1983-5, s.v. 
'•' RuizSimon 2005, 167-71. 
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similitudes, on the other hand, have greater exlension, being slructural features 
of LlulFs later Arts and cosmology, and so, operate at every ontological and 
epistemological lcvel, of which Christ is only the foremost representative. 
Gaya has been describing a process of contemplalive ascent, via sensory 
"figures," to the intellectual order; a process which, when applied to the person 
of Christ, involves a preliminary conlemplation of Christ's body, accessible as 
this is not only to the senses but also to the intellecl, and subsequent logical and 
metaphysical analyses of Christ 's (physical and intellectual) properlies and 
qualities. Such analyses, employing the intermediary "figure" of Chrisfs corpo-
reality, would result in an ultimately intellectual appreciation of Christ's human 
nature—which conjoins soul with body—and an intellectual appreciation of his 
divine nature, and the form in which these two natures are conjoined in one per-
son, that person being the second member of the Trinity. For Llull, thcrefore, the 
figure of Christ (and Christ-as-figure), presents man with the opportunity to 
attain a sensory appreciation of Christ's sensory properties and qualities, a sen-
sory appreciation of his intellectual properties and qualities, an intellectual 
appreciation of his intcllectual properties and qualities and, finally, an intellectu-
al appreciation of his sensory properties and qualities. 2" 
On the ontological rather than epistemological level, however, LlulFs fre-
quent use of the term "figure" to describe Christ can also be seen to indicate the 
manner in which thc Incarnation provides the opportunity for the senses (and 
the sensory order) to fulfil their aspiration towards the deity (God being "finis 
omnium corporalium") as well as the very means by which the deity might par-
ticipate in creation in a way which is maximally evident to the human perceptu-
al faculties. 2 7 Physical reality which is either elementative, vegetative, sensitivc 
;" Nol lo mention the mystical or supra-intellectual dimension of mans apprehension of Christ's 
divinily. available through ihe ascent from the positive through the eomparative to the superlative degree. 
For LlulPs taxonomy of knowledge, see Lohr 2000. 159-70, where the author describes LlulFs belief ihat 
the affinnation of the possibility of a doctrine was a necessary precondilion for ils denionstration. He 
illustrates how the exislence of possible (or intelleclual) beings formed a cornerstone of Llull's episte-
mology, as exemplified by LlulFs taxonomy of knowledge (the four degrees of: sensory-sensory; senso-
ry-intellectual; intellectual-intellectual; intellectual-sensory), the third degree of which permilted ihe 
enquirer lo attain intellectual knowledge of intellectual or possible things. Llulfs insistcnce upon the 
possibility of demonstrating the articles of faith through this third degree of knowledge is, for Lohr, what 
sets Llull apart from his contemporaries (particularly the Dominicans). [The text in this footnote is taken 
from my review of Lohrs article in SL42 (2002), 119-21.] 
" Disputalio eremitae et Raymundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sentenliarum Magistri 
Petri Loinbardi, MOG IV, iv, 82 (306); see also Liber de XIV articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catlioli-
cae Jidei (1283-5?): "Deus Filius esl finis tolius finis creaturae, & convenit. illum, cum quo ipse est 
eadem Persona, esse finem omnium hominum," MOG II, vi, 169-70 (589-90). See also Johnston's dis-
cussion of the polysemic nalure of the term "figure" as used by Llull in Chapter 362 of Llibre de conlem-
placid, in Johnston 1987. 79-80. 
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or imaginative, is not capable of the acts pertaining to the powers of the human 
soul (viz. remcmbering, undcrstanding and loving); it does have the capacity, 
however, lo attain ils end and, thus, find repose, in Chrisfs own body. As Llull 
explains in Dispittatio eremitae et Raymundi super ciliquibus dubiis quaestion-
ibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombarcli (Augusl 1298), God is the ultimate 
end of all physical things on account of His union with human nature, for the 
reason that the Son of God, existing as the body of Christ—which is God—par-
ticipates in the natures of all other corporeal beings and, therefore, by reason of 
this participation of his body in all that is corporeal, all corporeal creation is ele-
vated and exalted ("exaltata & sublimata"). 2* 
However, the uncreated, incorporeal divinity remains in all cases impercepti-
ble; even in the light of the reality of the Incarnation, there is no (direct) access 
of the senses to an experience of God. Nevertheless, in this latter case, the sens-
es, at least, are no longer destined to exist in a condition of unprofitability or 
frustration with regard to their ultimate iinality, their return lo God, since they 
may participate in Chrisfs (physical) humanity. For, as Llull explains in Con-
templatio Raymundi (1297), acccss to Christ in his deity is not without a medi-
um, that medium being the manner in which Chrisfs humanity participales in 
all corporeal creation; indeed, though Christ, as God man, is the end of all cor-
poreal creatures, his divinity cannot be attained through corporeality itself, as he 
(in his divine nature) is " insens ib i l i s , inmobi l i s , non i l luminabi l i s , inele-
mentabilis, non vegetabilis nec ymaginabilis"; 2 ' ' but, because of the conjunction 
of divinity and humanity (and of body and soul) in Christ, God is rendered per-
ceptible in His humanity, that is to say, as man. Christ 's divinity is thus, for 
Llull, one of those "other realities outside the range of sensory perceplion, but 
asserted as articles of faith.'"" 
We should note, however, that, at times, thc dual nature of Christ, in both its 
aspects, is fully implicated (and its role even emphasized) in the repose of phys-
;" Disputatio eremitae et Raymundi, MOG IV, iv, 82 (306). 
•"' Contemplatio Raymundi, ORL XVIII, 401-2. Christ's soul, in its spirituul nature, constitutes the 
link between His human corporealily and His divinity. See also Disputatio ereniilae el Rayinundi (1298), 
MOG IV, iv, 81-2 (305-6). Since God is not susceptible of being moved, nor is He available to the senses 
or the imagination, and He cannot be produced either from the four elements or froni vegetation. it falls 
to the powers of the human soul (memory, understanding and will) to dirccl their acts lowards Him. 
*' Cf. supra. It should be noted that. though the above arguments may appear to conflate (the larger 
set of) the sensory order (including animals, of which the human animal is the highesl representative) and 
(the subset of) the order of man's perceptual powers (in which the former order fmds itself resumed), 
man-as-microcosm figures in the sensory order as its perfection precisely because his physical nature is 
conjoined with a spiritual nature (which can be equated with the intellectual order), this also being thc 
reason why his senses are more noble than those of animals. Jesus Christ figures in this scheme as the 
fullest perfection of creation, the means by which the entire field of creation is recapitulated and returned 
to its creator. 
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ical creation; for, in whal represents an interesting variation upon his earlier 
statements, Llull affirms the following year, in Chapter 11 of De quadratura et 
triangulatura circuli (June 1299) (concerning the nalure of the hypostatic union 
in Christ and its function of recapitulating creation and bringing it to fullness 
and completion), that all created ends are contained in the end of the human and 
the divine natures of Jesus Christ, finding there thcir repose, fuliilmenl, and per-
feclion." It is, in fact, the very conjunction of divinity with humanity in Christ 
which exalts and elevates not only Chrisf s human nature itself but, with it, the 
entire created universe.' 2 
Created beings, in this respect, exist primarily as varying degrees of reflec-
tion or signification of their creator, according to the position they occupy on a 
vertical scale between being and non-being. Chrisf s existence as God-man—as 
conjunction of uncreated and created, of infinite and finite—is the paradigm 
case of such signification, particularly in Llulfs writings from the mid-1280s 
onward, Christ being not only the most perfect created sign of God's internal 
(and uncrealed) Trinitarian dynamic but also an index of the complelion or per-
fection of created being. For Llull, signification, manifestation and demonstra-
tion, are cognates of the "metaphysics of participalion"—participation being 
itself a cognate of deification—in which each element of crcation plays its part 
through the t ransmission of a resemblance (an image or reflection) of its 
creator." 
However, while signification is essentially an ascending movement, ' 4 and the 
bestowal of degrees of being upon creation can only be a descent, participation 
and reflection operate in both direclions (though, in the latter case, with one of 
" Armand Llinares, "Version francaise de la premiere partie de Ia "Quadrature et triangulature du 
cercle"", EL 30 (1990), pp. 240-5 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Dr. Yanis Dambergs for bringing 
the presence of these passages in this work to my attention. 
Ibid. Here—Chaper 11—Llull affirms that the value of Christ's human nature is increased by its 
conjunction with divinity. See also Liber praedicationis contra judaeos, ROL XII, 51-2. where Llull 
states that as a consequence of the hypostatic union. the created universe is thus elevated on account of 
the participation of Chrisfs human nature in the five parts of which the universe consists (the elemcnta-
tive, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, and the rational). For further discussion of Chrisfs role as medi-
um between God and creation, though, on this oceasion, couched in terms of the proportion the finilc, 
created world bears to Chrisfs human nalure and the proportion this latter bears, in turn, to infinite. 
uncreated divine nature, see this article, text after note 69. 
" Johnston cxpresses dissatisfaction with the "diffusion of LlulPs Principia." staling ihat "the funda-
mental indistinction of any metaphysics of participation through resemblance [is that] resemblance 
describes the participalion that explains it." Johnston 1987, 51. See also Bonner's introduction in OS I, 
63 (note 38 and text), for commcnts regarding the synonymy of signification, manifestation and demon-
stration. 
" Although we must nole the reciprocal signification of thc Incarnation and the Trinily, which are 
eonceived only in LIull's final works in cxplicit terms of ascent and descent. On the uniquc possibilily of 
descent forbeing, according to Platzeck, see Badia's introduction lo Pring-Mill 1991, 15-16. 
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its lerms as the exemplar or object and the other as its imagc). Thus, although 
for contemplative purposes, the mind can ascend the chain of bcing and, on an 
onlological level, beings can participate in both higher and lower levels of 
being, Being itself is exclusively the gift of the Supreme Being, as cause of the 
created realms. Nevertheless the intellect is also capable of tracing this descenl 
through creation as we see in one of LlulFs later works, Liber de ascensu et 
descensu intellectus (1305). In the figure of Christ, however, all movemcnts are 
present: the ascending and descending contemplat ive (i.e. epis temological) 
movements; the ascending and descending ontological movements of (maximal) 
participation in the divinity—and hence, signification's ascent in the semantic 
order—and of the d ivini ly ' s reciprocal part icipat ion in creat ion; yet a lso, 
uniquely and maximally in the case of created beings, the descending ontologi-
cal movement consisting of Christ 's bestowal of being upon creation, in his role 
as efficienl and exemplary cause. Further, in Chrisl there is a maximal resem-
blance or bi-directional specularity (see section iii of this article) between God's 
maximal external operation and His internal operation or Trinity, a maximal 
resemblanee, that is, betwccn object and image, a resemblance or similitude in 
which Christ is equally exemplar or object, image, and medium of reflection. 
There are three important ways in which Llull considers signification, simili-
tude and example, in relation to the figure of Christ. The llrst is epistemological: 
that is to say, he considers Christ 's role in signifying the perfect divine attributes 
to the human intellect; the second is ontological: that is to say, he considers 
Christ in terms of his supreme likeness to God; and thc third is moral: that is to 
say, he views Christ 's example as an example of how to remember, understand, 
love and serve God. Already in Llibre de contemplacio (1273-4?), while dis-
cussing the Incarnation in the context of recreation, Llull views the Incarnation 
as a privileged sign of the perfect Qualities of God. He states that just as God's 
Virtues signify that thc world was created in order that the nobility and perfec-
tion of the creator be known, so too do they signify that He assumed flesh, suf-
fered, and died for us sinners in order that these Virtues (or Qualities) might bc 
signilied to us. For the more the creator does for His creation, the more His 
Qualities (mercy, love, humility, generosity, power, perfection) are signified to 
His creatures. ' 5 We note here how, although Llull is considering a redemplivc 
Incarnation, its redemptive quality is, in effect, subordinatcd to the formal prop-
erties of its supreme signifying power, that is to say, to its role in the more gen-
eral manifestation of God's Virtues or Qualities,"' for recreation is conccived to 
be the maximum that God can do for His creation only insofar as it is the very 
" Uibre de contemplacid, 248:24. Here Llull uses the terms Virtues and Qualilies interehangeably. 
"' Even at this early stage then, we lind a degree of equivocalness in LlulPs view of the purpose of 
thc Incarnation, allhough, clearly, he exalts one of the terms over the other. 
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means whereby His Qualities are most nobly signified to creation." Later in 
LlulTs writings, the notions of the perfection of the universe through Chrisfs 
reinstitution of the fundamental similitude between man and God, will replace 
recreation tout court as the maximum in this formula." 
By the time of Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae (1288-9) 
and Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles (1289?) 
Llull has come to speak of the Incarnalion as the supreme likeness to God, the 
end of all things created, and of Christ as the greatest refleclion of the divine 
attribules, the exemplary image manifesling these latter to the human intellcct."' 
Elucidating upon this point, Llull states, also in Compendium seu commentum 
Artis demonstrativae, that the Incarnation establishes the greatest resemblance 
between the inlrinsic and exlrinsic operation of the divine allribules. 4" Seven 
years later, in Llibre dels articles de lafe(\296), while discussing the greatness 
of the similitudes of the divine Reasons in the Incarnation, Llull explains that 
each Reason has greater concordance in its crealed manifestation ("les rahons 
del mon") with greatness by reason of majorily than by reason of minority. 4 1 On 
account of this, Llull argues that it is necessarily true that the Dignities or Rea-
sons of God require the majority of their similitude in this world in order that 
they achieve full activity and iind reposc, while also ensuring the concordancc 
of the greatesl uncreated and created reasons. The entire passage between lines 
32-56 constitutes a veritable encomium to the humanity of Chrisl whosc human 
reasons are deified and sustained in the man God. 4 2 It is inleresting to note 
" Ibid., 248:22. 
See Liberpraedicationis contra judaeos, ROL XII. 58: "Et sie sequitur. quod Inearnatio Filii Dei 
sit, ut perficiat subiectum imperfectum de subiecto simpliciter perfecto." 
" Compendium seu commentum Anis deinonstrativae, MOG III, vi, 77 (369); Quaestiones per Artem 
demonstrativam seu invenlivam soiubiles, MOG IV, iii, 47-8 (63-4) 
40 Compendium seu commentum Artis demonslrativae, MOG III, vi, 77 (369). 
41 Llibre dels articles de lafe, NEORL III, 50,11. 32-35. 
" Ibid., 11. 51-2. Also, however, we note the force of the distinction between God's uncreated "rea-
sons" or attributes ("Deus [...] ab ses rahons propres et essencials", "les divines rahons") and crealed 
simililudes or "reasons" ("les rahons del mon"), the latter of which are displacements from (or lesser par-
ticipations in) the essential attributes of God themselves, though Llull insists upon the imperalive for the 
maximity of Ihe resemblance between the two. particularly in Christ's "ssupposil dc dues natures, divina 
e humana". ibid. II. 34-40 and 47-8. Nevertheless in a transitional work of 1288-9, at least, and in thc 
context of the deification of Christ's humanity, Llull does spcak of internal" and external likenesses' or 
similitudes of God, thc former being God Himself, the lalter being man. Compeiidiuin seu commenlum 
Artis demonsiraiivae, MOG 111, vi. 77-8 (369-70). There does seem to be some overlap, at least, if not an 
incipient distinction (and, therefore, displacement). in LlulTs use of the terms "similitudes" and "rea-
sons", created or uncreated. see Conlemplatio Raymundi, ORL XVIII, 401. Llull uses a variety of terms 
to designate God's essential attributes: progressively and variously calling them "Virtues." "Qualities," 
"Dignilies" and "Reasons." Trinkaus 1973-4. 138. points out that due lo the Patristic tendency to see cre-
ation in emanationist terms, "in a sense [for the Greek Falhers, at least] the presence of the divine image 
in man was an estrangement of the divine nature". 
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again, however, that in the midst of this wealth of concepts wilh its protcan ter-
minology, Llull is able, at different periods of his production, to reconcile his 
criterion that the Dignities must manifest themselves maximally in creation not 
only with the thesis of a redemptive Incarnation but also with the thesis of 
Chrisfs renewal of the relationship of similitude between God and man (i.e the 
deification of man through the deification of Chrisfs humanity) and even with 
both theses together held in asymmetrical synthesis. 4 1 
This maximal manifestation or signilication of similitude to the divine attrib-
utes, is also treated in terms of influence, the mode of the Incarnation being sus-
tained in the mode of the divine Reasons "sicut modus qui est inter causam et 
effectum." The cause influences its effect with its simililudes and reasons, so 
that cause can be effect and effect cause. 4 4 Llull mentions this influence in the 
context of his proof that the purpose of the world is so exalted in goodness, 
greatness e t c , because the divine Reasons are permitted to flnd their repose in 
the Incarnation. 4 5 LlulFs God, therefore, though ultimately transcendent, is no 
Deus absconditusf' He openly manifests His Reasons in creation, exerting an 
influcncc as cause on effect, as we see in Liber ad probandum aliquos articulos 
fidei catholicae per syllogisticas rationes or Liber cle syllogismis (February 
1304), where Llull refers to Christ as the created mirror of the uncreated Virtues 
and their influence in creation. 4 7 These sections all refer to the role of the Incar-
nation in revealing the likenesses ("simililudines") of God and His influence in 
creation. This focus on the notion of (a two-way) influence ("influentia et reflu-
entia") is already present, however, in Compendium seu commentum Artis 
" Llibre de contemplacid, 248:22, 24; Compendium seu commentwn Artis deinonstrativae, MOG III, 
vi, 77-8 (369-70). 
44 Contemplatio Raymundi, ORL XVIII, 401. 
" Ibid, 400-1. 
'"' Indeed, in Liberpraedicationis conlra jttdaeos (Augusl 1305), ROL XII, 22, Llull, in the Sixth Ser-
mon, conimenting on the Biblical injunction: "Non habeas Deum alienum" (Ex. 34, 14), even describes 
God as "Deu[s[ vicinu[s[" on account of His conjunction with human nalure. He goes on to explain, in 
the same passage, that "...est ergo Deus incarnalus, ut non sit nobis Deus alienus, ut sit medium inter 
ipsum et nos per participationem altam el sublimem," ibid. Some ten or so years earlier. in Coinpendium 
arlis demonstralivae (1288-9), MOG III, vi, 77-8 (369-70), Llull expressed, in the densest correlative ter-
minology—which distinguishes here between a proxiniate and a remote passive correlative of "Deitas"-, 
the proximity established between God and man. through the conjunclion of natures in Christ: he states 
that God created man in greater resemblance to Him than all other creatures, but Ihal He created one man 
above all men in His image, "quem tanquam Deificabile remotum Deificat in Deifieabile propinquo, 
induens illum hominem lolum Deum in Deilicabile propinquo. qui Deificabilis propinquis esl eadem 
nalura divina cum suomet Deificativo," such that just as the sensory ("sensatum") and the rational soul 
togelher make a man, so an homificate ("homificatum") and God are one subslance or person ("supposi-
lum") that we call Chrisl. 
" Liber ad probandwn aliquos articulos fidei calholicae per syllogisticas raliones or Liber de syllo-
gisntis, ROL XX, 471-2. 
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demonstrativae,*' where Llull indicates that the second Person of the Trinity is 
the inlinite and elernal simililude of the Father, and man, the greatest cxternal 
simililude to God, is deified by that Person. Similarly, the union of God and 
man is a union of internal and cxternal similitudes of God, and Christ, in his 
supreme simililude to God, is the end of all creation. 
At the very end of the Ternary Phase and beyond, this theme of Christ as 
supreme likeness is taken up again. In Ars compendiosa Dei (May 1308) he 
recommences his superlativisation of Christ, stating that Chrisfs human mercy 
is the supreme and perfect sign of God's mercy; that Chrisl 's humanity is the 
first principle by which God as creative first principle is refiected, known, and 
loved ("speculatum, cognilum et dilectum"); that the Incarnation (as the ulti-
mate finality of the world) is the supreme sign of God's perfection; and, linally, 
that Chrisfs function is to signify by his supreme created illiation the supreme 
uncreated filiation. 4 ' We notice here that Christ does not simply signify the pcr-
fect divine attributes, as in Llibre de contemplacio, but he signifies these per-
fectly and supremely, a theme also reiterated in Supplicatio Raymundi venera-
bilibus et sublimis sacratissimae theologiae professoribus ac baccalariis studii 
Parisiensis (June 1310), where Llull refers to Christ as the supreme sign of the 
supreme signified. 5 0 Similarly, in Liber de quaestione valde alta et profunda 
(August 1311), Llull refers to the Incarnat ion as the supreme sign of the 
superlativity of divine nalure ("signum maximitatis et plenissimatis nalurac div-
inae," "signum plenissimum plenissimati et eternalissimati, quia sine signo sig-
nalum non esset cognitum"). 5 1 This entire focus on Christ as a sign ariscs from 
Llull's belief that although God requires nothing exlernal to Himself by reason 
of a lack, He does require a (supreme) sign whereby He might be signilied and 
so, known and loved. Following certain suggestions of Ruiz Simon, it might be 
possible here to read LlulTs emphasis, from the timc of the Compendium seu 
commentum Artis demonstrativae (1289) onwards, upon the supreme similitude 
of the Incarnation to God and the superlativity of Christ as signifier as echoes of 
the language of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. 5 2 
While LlulFs early preoccupation with Chrisfs atonemcnt of Original Sin 
gradually diminishes, the need for Christ as an example of the way to honour 
and serve God nevertheless persists until at least 1288-9, at which time there is 
an intensilication of his focus upon Christ nol only as sign of the perfect quali-
" Compendium seu commentum Artis demonsirativae, MOG III, vi, 77-8 (369-70). 
"ArscompendiosaDei, ROLX\i\, 151, 154, 208-9, 228. 
" Supplicatio Raymundi, ROL VI, 248. 
" Liber de quaestione valde aha eiprofunda, ROL VIII, 166-7. 
B Ruiz Simon 2005, 178-82. 
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ties of God, S 3 but also variously as supreme likeness to God, 5 4 as supreme sign of 
God's perfection, 5 3 and as supreme sign of the supreme signified. 5 6 Here there is 
a progressive superlativisation of Chrisfs humanity and of his external simili-
tude to (and signiilcation of) God's internal attributes. Nevertheless, before this 
development, Llull often insists upon the need for Chrisfs Passion as an exam-
ple of martyrdom (i.e. as the extreme and ultimate means to love, honour and 
serve God), 5 7 and as a sign of his love for man, to be emulated by suffering and 
dying a martyr's death in an effort to return that love. 5 s In Llibre de contem-
placio, Llull extolled the image of Christ on the cross as the most beautiful 
image, sign, and exemplar possible, 5 ' ' and went on to lament that such an image 
did not inspire people more to follow its meaning unto death."" In fact, in Felix 
or Llibre de meravelles (1288-9), Llull has Blaquerna recount an exemplum 
illustraling that thc world is not in error on account of any failing on the part of 
Chrisfs Passion, but rather it is so on account of man's reluctance to follow the 
customs embodied by Christ's example and those of his apostles, martyrs and 
other holy men. 6 1 
Such expressions of missionary zeal and desire for a martyr's dealh may dis-
appear from Llulfs writing after this point, but this does little to diminish his 
fcrvour and respect for Christ 's example in his own missionary practice and 
apologetic aims. Llull probably starts to de-emphasise this active endorscment 
of Christ 's Passion-as-exemplar (to Christians) in favour of a more broadly 
Apostolic model around the time of writing Felix (1288-9). This change might 
be attributed to the development of his ideas on the primacy of Christ and relat-
ed thcories contributing to the superlativisation of Chrisfs person and purpose, 
as well as to certain of the preparations involved in his shift from a quaternary 
to a ternary system. Another possible—and, in this instance, extrinsic—reason 
for Llulfs change of heart, may lie in a more marked focus upon apologetics, 
that is to say, a greater consideration of his Muslim and Jewish audiences, bolh 
of whose faiths accepted that atonement was possible without an Incarnation. 6 2 
Though many of LlulFs carlicr writings seek to demonstratc the gencrality of 
Original Sin and the necessity of an Incarnation in the name of atonement, it 
" Uibre de coniempkuid. 248:24. 
" Compendium seu commentum Ani.s demonstrativae, MOG 111. vi, 77 (369). 
" Ars compendiosa Dei. ROL XIII, 208-9. 
" Supplicatio Raymundi, ROL VI, 248. 
" Llibre de contemplacid. 55:9-10. 
"Ibid., Chapters87, 90, 91. 
Ibid.. 123:19-20. 
'"Ibid.. 123:24. 
" Felix or Llibre de meravelles. OS II. 57. 
, , ; Davies and Leftow (eds) 2004, 283. 
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may have begun to seem to him to be more expedient, more urgent even, to seek 
further, more potent reasons, reasons which might be more readily acceptablc to 
those of the Islamic and Judaic faiths. It is in such a light that we should view 
LlulFs introduction of Neoplalonic concepts of repose, influence and reflucnce, 
and the processes of deification and hominification, which begin to appear dur-
ing Llulfs transition period between the composilion of the Art demostrativa (c. 
1283) and that of the Ars inventiva veritatis (1290). 
Perhaps the most significant reason for Llulfs change of approach, is his 
decision to forge a theodicy which gives precedence to the consummation of 
humankind, initialed by the reinstitution of man's forfeited likeness to God and, 
by some accounts, the separate resumption of man's divinisation (both effected 
by the resurrected and glorified Christ), over his earlier predominant concentra-
tion upon Chrisfs passible nalure and the determining role of Original Sin (with 
its correlatives of the crucified Christ and man's atonement) in the economy of 
salvation. In this way, Llull can focus his thought—and man's efforts—upon thc 
likeness to divinity held up to man at his future consummation, given a life of 
Christian faith, understanding, virtue and sacramental observance, ralher than 
upon the forfeiture of that likeness and ils inhcritance as an ineradicable blemish 
by succeeding generations of men.' , , So, despite Llulfs continuing recognition 
of the role of Christ's Passion in the redemptive function of the Incarnation con-
sequenl upon Original Sin, a marked preference develops for a thesis which 
undcrlines the dignity of man as opposed to the "misery of the human condi-
tion". 6 4 Notwithstanding this, however, Llulfs decision seems to be based upon 
the adoplion of an imago Dei theology which, unlike that of Aquinas, also bears 
witness to the Patristic distinction between image and likeness. Thus, while 
Llull progressively, through his contemplation of the role of Christ and thc asso-
ciated mysteries, points to the end to which man is ordercd, namely his deifica-
tion, ralher than to what he is, or has forfeited (the likeness) or had corruptcd 
(the image) as a resull of the Fall, he nonctheless at all times gives voice to the 
lack at the heart of man's current condition, a lack which can only be rectified 
and completed by the resurrected Christ. 
"' For ccrtain similarilies and ditTerences between LlulFs own and Eastern-Christian views of deili-
cation and its relation lo Original Sin, see Hughes 2005, 287-90; see also Meyendorff 1974/1979, 160-
161, for the distinction between sin's corruplion of mans Iikeness to God and its interruption of man's 
divinisation or deification in Byzantine Christianity. 
"' These two latter themes, deriving from Ihe tradilions initialed by the Iwo fourth-century writers 
Lactanlius and Arnobius, were recognised literary genres by the late-lwelfth cenlury, Trinkaus 1973-4, 
140. 
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2. Christ as the most adequate external sign of God's internal activity 
In Excusatio Raymundi (December 1308-February 1309),—one of the ilrst 
few works of the Post-Art Phase following the composition of Ars brevis (Janu-
ary 1308) and Ars compendiosa Dei (May 1308)—Llull makes use of the Twcn-
tieth Fallacy, or fallacy of apparent contradiction. 6 5 His proofs of God's infinile 
internal agency (bonificare, magnificare etc.) thus serve as proofs of the Trinity. 
Llull dislinguishes between God's intcrnal agency, which must be infinite in 
order to be equivalent to His (infinite) existence, and His external agency, which 
cannot be infinite (as creation cannot receive infinitude). 6 6 
A slightly different procedure is used, however, for proofs of the Incarnation. 
Llull still focuses on the fact of God's internal agency but now considered from the 
viewpoint of whether the besl, greatest etc. being requires an external sign of this 
internal agency, that sign being Christ. Christ is the external sign by which God's 
internal agency is known. If God is the being who is the "ens magis agens bonum, 
magnum," e t c , He requires an cxternal sign of this (so that He is known as the "ens 
magis agens bonum," e tc ) . Llull makes wide use of (negative) hypotheses ("facta 
hypothesi, quod Deus non sit ens magis agens bonum e t c , sequitur quod non 
requirat signum magis bonum etc."). 6 1 But Llull has already demonslrated in his 
proofs of the Trinity that God is the "ens magis agens bonum e tc ," therefore.... 
The proofs of the Trinity focus on God's infinitude as an internally activc being; his 
proofs of the Incarnation focus on God's need for an external sign of this agency. 
What seems implicit in all this is that if God is internally and infinitely 
active, then He requires the most adequate sign of this in the created world, pre-
cisely because He is not infinitely active in creation, that is to say, externally. 
For, as Llull tells us, if God were not a Trinity (i.e. actively the best, greatest etc. 
being) He would not require a sign, which is here, by definition, external and so, 
created. Llull, however, does not really go into detail as to how the incarnated 
Christ might signify the Trinity, God's "summa intensa agentia extensive."6' 
"' Bonncr silualcs LlulTs usc of this fallacy in Ihc contcxl of his rarc citation of authuritics in this text 
and of his efforts to demonstrate the capacities of his system of thought as an alternative to seholasticisni 
rather than simply to correct the errors of his conlemporaries and predecessors, Bonner 2005, 51. For a 
discussion of LlulPs use of apparent contradiclions, sce Ruiz Simon 1999, 168-82, wherc the author 
identifies this "Twentieth Fallacy" or fallacia nova as a developmenl of the Aristotelian fallacy known as 
de ignorantia elenclii. with the difference that in Llulls new fallacy (apparent) formal conlradiction (in 
bolh quantity and quality) occurs not only in Ihe conclusion, but in the premises as well. LlulTs use of 
this fallacy is designed to protecl ihe unily of Chrislian knowledge (faith and reason) againsl (Averroist) 
attempts to profess thc Christian faith while defending philosophical theses which contradicl that faith. 
* Excusalio Raymundi. ROL XI (1983), 337-47. 
"' In fact, here Llull combines demonstralioper negationem and demonstratio per hypotliesim. 
" Ibid. 
SPECULUM, SIMILITUDE, AND SIGNIEICATION 23 
In Distinction II of Liber de majori agentia Dei (March 1309), writtcn only a 
monlh laler, Llull again states his intention to prove the Incarnalion, this timc 
via the principles adapted from his Artistic period (unity, goodness, greatness, 
eternity, power, intellect, will, virtue, truth, glory, nature, perfection), and by 
means of the majority of external agency in God, which is a sign of the majority 
of His internal agency. In §§ 13, 16-18, Llull asserts that the Incarnation is the 
suprcme created sign of God's internal agency, without which there would bc a 
lack of proportion between the supreme signified and its proportionate sign 
("careret proportio inter signatum summum et signum proporlionatum."). w 
The Dictat de Ramon and Coment del Dictat (both December 1299) are sig-
nificant works also in relation to this latter theme, on account of their assertions 
regarding the proportion eslablished between the inlinite and finite through the 
Incarnation and their mutual accommodation and union. 7" Here, as in Lectura 
super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem (1294-5), Llull links the recipro-
cal parlicipation of God and creation through Christ to the theme of thc propor-
tion between iniinite and finite eslablished through God's assumption of human 
flesh, this participation being an index of God's great love for man." Thus, in 
his commentary on lines 183-4 of Dictat de Ramon ("Iniinit ha proporcio / ab 
nos per encarnacio") , Llull affirms that it is fitting that there be proportion 
between intinite and finite, by which the finite can have its end and perfection in 
the infinite and participate in its nature, having already established God's parlic-
ipation in creation in the previous section. Llull here makes clear that the pro-
portion betwecn iniinite God and iinite man exists in the Incarnation inasmuch 
as God has linitude insofar as He is made man, yet not with respect to Himself. 
"' Liber de majori agenlia Dei (1309). Estudios Franciscanos 46 (1934), 316. In Liber de perver-
sione enlis removenda (December 1309), ROL V, 502-3, we also find a further reference to the Incarna-
tion as the supreme sign of divine operation conditional upon the union of divine and human natures in 
Christ. For LlulFs definitions of "Proporcid I Proportio," see Bonner and Ripoll 2002, 253-4. His defini-
tions of this term do not resemble our modern mathematical notions of proportion. as when he states in 
Taula d'esla Art (September 1293-January 1294), ORL XVII, 395 thal "Proporcid es orde de graus a una 
cosa, axi com a regiment, cavaller, comte o rey, o axi com a hom senlir e ymaginar e enlendre." "Propor-
cid" is later defined in Ldgica nova (May 1303), NEORL IV, 77, as "...abit de actu de justicia o de equal-
itat, e constituit dc disposicid. E la rahd es car proporcio demoslra justicia e concordansa." "disposicid" 
and the "potencia-objet-actus" triad are also dcfined in the same work, ibid., 75; in the Lalin text, "dispo-
sitio", ROL XXIII, 92, 11. 374-6; "proportio", ibid., 94,11. 438-40; "potentia-obiectum-actus", ibut, 93, II. 
386-91. 
'" Dictal de Ramon, ORL XIX, 270; Coinenl del Diclal. ORL XIX, 305; Diclali coinmentum, ROL 
XIX, 389-390, II. 143-158. Dominguez notes thal the Catalan text of the Coment in the ORL series 
comes from a single. relatively modern manuscript with many lacunae. errors and misreadings, adding 
that, although, individually, each lext is deficient, the Calalan texl of ihe Comeiit, ihe I5th-cenlury Span-
ish version transcribed by Dominguez himself, and the Latin lext published in ROL XIX, "ofrecen con-
juntamente un texto suficientemente seguro," Dominguez 1996, 57. 
" Leclura super Arlem invemivain el Tabulam generalem. MOG V, v, 153 (511). 
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Without the Incarnalion, no such proportion would exist and man would not 
attain his end or purpose, which end itself is said to be infmite. But Llull is also 
careful to note that in such union between the infinite and the finite, there is no 
debasement of God's nature for, insofar as He assumes any human defects, He 
does so as man, not God; nor is there any composition, since infinite and finite 
cannot form a composite, for composition can only exist with respect to finite 
parts, time, and quantity, which do not pertain to the divine nature. 7 2 Thus Llull 
maintains the possibility of a union between the inllnite and the ilnite which the 
evil demon ("lo mal Esprit") in Medicina de pecat (July 1300) would have us 
believe was impossible on the grounds thal they are so different as to be incom-
patible and unable to form a union. 7 ' 
In Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo (December 1300), Llull states that this pro-
portion which exists between God and creation, is achieved in the Incarnation 
through the proportion the world bears to Christ 's human nature, which itself 
bears proportion to divine nalure. 7 4 Creation on its own could not attain such 
proportion, but can only do so as a result of the humanity of Jesus, the end 
lowards which the whole world is ordered and created. Thus without God 's 
assumption of human flesh, this would not be possible." In Liberde Trinitate et 
Incarnatione (September 1305), however, he concedes that a creature cannot 
have an infinite cnd, though maintains that the will can desire an end which is 
greater than that of all other crealures ("magis magnus omnibus creaturis") and 
the intellcct understand it. If there were no such greatest being, however, there 
would indeed be infinite multiplication (of God 's Dignilies in creation) and 
there could be no repose for God in creation or vice versa. 7 6 In a following 
response to a further objection, Llull also maintains that, in fact, there can be 
proportion between uncreated and created greatness in the Incarnation. 7 7 This 
proportion between a supremely infinile and supremely finite being exists pri-
marily on account of their very conjunction, and this proporlion is maximal, 
because it is the effect of the supreme cause. 7 8 
12 Coment del Dirtat, ORL XIX, 314-5; Dictati commentum, ROL XIX, 385-6 . 
" Medicina de pecal, ORL XX, 98. 
" A point also made a few years earlier in Proverbis de Ramoii (1296?): "Tot lo mdn es creat e pro-
porcionat a Jhesu Crist," ORL XIV, 42 . 
" Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo, ROL XXI, 382. 
'" Liber de Trinitate et liicarnatione, ROL XII, 117. 
" Ibid. 
" Emphasising the very dependence of creation upon God's logically prior decree of the Inearnation 
and. thus. explicitly affirming the primacy of Christ thesis. Llull slates, in Disptitatio Raymundi christiani 
el llamar Saraceni (April 1307). ROL XXII, 197-8, that without the Incamation, God would not be dis-
posed to create the world—which is finite and new—because there exists no proportion between the inli-
nite and the finilc, the eternal and the new: the reason for this is, because the ultimale end cannot be the 
middle belween them, unless it be by means of the conjunclion of divine and human natures achieved by 
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In a later work, Ars tnystica theologiae et philosophiae (November 1309), 
Llull makes clear that it is the effecl of the Incarnation lo exalt the universe to 
the highest possible degree as a result of the conjunction of divine and human 
nalures. If this were not the case, however, there would be an immense differ-
ence , an unbridgeable gap, existing between the optimal goodness of God 
(cxisting in the superlative degree) and the goodness of the world. Christ is thus 
the link between positive and superlalive degrees, between finite and inlinitc, 
and through the Incarnation proportion is achieved between the superlative 
cause and its superlative effect. 7 9 
Wc have seen Llull progress from a notion of Christ as (privileged) sign of 
the divine attributes to that of Chrisl as supreme sign of these, via a distinction 
between created and uncrealed similitudes. He moves towards a considcration 
of the duality and conjunction of human and divine natures in Christ in terms of 
external and internal similitudes of the dynamic divine attributes via a medita-
tion upon the proportion eslablished between God and man in and through 
Christ, the perfection of whose deified humanity is the closest approximation 
possible to divinity in the created realm. Underlying such movement is Llulf s 
continuing preoccupation with the nature of the relationship between the Incar-
nation and the Trinity, with a particular focus upon the manner in which the for-
mer signifies the latter. 
3 . The Trinity and the Incarnation 
During the period between Llibre cle demostracions (1274-6) and Liber de 
divina voluntate infinita et orciinata (January 1314), Llull cmbarks upon a sus-
tained delinealion of the relations existing belween the Trinity and the Incarna-
tion. In Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem (c. 1274), he had already stipu-
laled the rcasons why the three Persons of the Trinity did nol become incarnalc; 
the Incarnalion. As an indication otjust how the primacy of Chrisl thesis exists side by side with a con-
ception of a redemptive Incamation—even in some of Llulls later works—the reader should compare 
the above passage with that found in ibid.. 238 (Ad 4). 
75 Ars mystica tlieologiae et philosophiae, ROL V, 340. Johnston states. however, that "Llull explicit-
ly recognizes that there is no proportion of Creatorto creature," Johnston 1987, 18 (emphasis added). cit-
ing only Liber de inventione maiore (September 1315), ROL II, 302, in support of this claim.. The rele-
vant passage from Dist. III, De quaestionibus, 9, actually slatcs ihal "[u]nitas divina melius polcsl 
agnosci cum una creatura maiori, quam cum minori; quia inler maius et minus nulla est simililudo," ibid.. 
the verb "agnoscere" meaning "to perceive or recognise." Whal this article illustrates however, is that, 
despite LlulFs statement in Dictaticommentum, ROL XIX, 390, II. 157-8, that "inter infmitum et fini-
tum non sit aliqua proportio", proportion does exist between ereator and creature, and maximally in the 
case of Jesus Christ. that most noble created being through whose Incarnation such proportion is estab-
lished. 
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he expressed these reasons in terms of the basic investigative components of 
Figure S and other principles, namely [F G T] [Majorily Difference Concor-
dance] [E A] . (Broadly speaking, LlulTs conclusion is thal the difference in the 
Persons of God is better signified if only one of these assumed flesh, and by 
grea ter di f ference is s ignif ied grea te r c o n c o r d a n c e be tween these three 
Persons).*" Some twenty years later, in Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabu-
lam generalem (1294-5) (Dist. III, Part i, Q. 2, Tertia Quaestio D: "De quo esl 
Incarnatio Dei?", § 2, Solulio: D E T D), he explains why it is fitting that the 
Son of God should be incarnated, giving the reason that, if it were not the Son 
of God who was incarnated, there would follow contrariety in the Incarnalion 
against liliation, paternity, and spiration, and the proportion of the filiation of 
man would be lacking, as would be also the possificability and duration of the 
Incarnation.*1 Though there are evident differenccs between his treatment of this 
same question in the two works, most notably his use of the correlative termi-
nology and the absence of Figure S, Llull's ideas upon the relationship between 
the Trinily and the Incarnation remain relatively constant throughout this entire 
period, though al times—and particularly in his linal writings—he clearly sub-
ordinales the truth of the Incarnation in its function as the world's end to that of 
God's self-origination in the Trinity. There is initially great emphasis on the way 
in which the Incarnation acts as a sign of, that is to say, demonstrates or pro-
vides an image or reflection of, the operations of the Trinity, though also, at 
times, Llull indicates that Trinity and Incarnalion offer reciprocal demonstra-
tions of each other. 8 2 The commonality between Trinity and Incarnation also 
finds itself reflected in the fact that in certain works Llull uses the same pre-
cepts, and indeed, common means, to signify and demonstrate both Articles of 
Faith.*' It is only in later works such as Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tab-
ulam generalem (1294-5), and in final works such as Liber cle concordantia et 
contrarietate (December 1313), and Liber de divina voluntate infinita et orclina-
"' Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, MOG I, vii, 32 (464). For a similar argument, though with-
out the alphabetical notation. see also Llibre de demostracions, ORL XV, 418-9. In the previous section 
(Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, Distinction III, Part II, Question 8) Llull had demonstrated 
which Person olthe Trinity became incarnate, by analogy with the process according to which fire gcner-
ates natural heat in its quest for conjunction, this conjunction itself being the medium by which the same 
heat is the form generated from matter in vegetables or animals, Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem. 
MOG I. vii, 32 (464). 
" Lectura super Ariem invenlivam el Tabiilam generalem, MOG V, v, 156 (514). Possificabilitas is 
the noun deriving from the passive correlative—namely, possificabile—of possificare, the verb dcnoting 
the action of the principle of God's Power or Poteslas. 
"2 Llibre de demostracions, ORL XV, 471. 
Disputacid de cinc savis (1294), ATCA 5, 102-57; Supplicatio Raymundi (1310), ROL VI, 237; 
Liber de parlicipatione chrisiianorum et saracenorum (1312), ROL XVI, 247-8. 
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ta (January 1314) ihat Llull insists upon the relative inferiority of God's Incar-
nation to the supreme end of His self-origination. 8 4 
Llull alrcady establishcs a parallelism, however, between the Trinity and thc 
Incarnation, the former being the excellent work within the supreme good, by 
which is signified the Trinity, the latter being the greal work the supreme good 
effects in lower things, by which is signified the Incarnation, in the five condi-
tions of Book IV of Llibre de demostracions (1274-6). 8 1 This common ground 
between these Articles is also reasserted in the Fifth Condition where Llull con-
cedes that the demonstrations of the Trinity and Incarnation can be opposed and 
contradicted by other opinions, namely by what he calls "false, destructible 
similitudes" ("falses semblanses destruables"). God permits this, he explains, so 
that man should be free to believe or understand the Articles of Faith for, if the 
Arlicles were so demonstrable that they could not be contradicted, men could 
not have faith in them nor would the intellect be so exalted in understanding 
them. 8 6 
This intimate relationship between Trinity and Incarnation is again made 
clear in Book IV, where Llull states that the Incarnation signifies and demon-
strates God's infinite internal activity or aseity. 8 7 The Incarnation is seen as a 
means of demonstrating the Trinity at several other points in this work as well. 8 8 
Chapter 20, § 1, argues that just as the lower good signifies and demonstratcs 
the divine attributes in the supreme good, so it is necessarily fitting that it 
should give a demonstration of the Trinity. On account of this and further rea-
sons, Llull claims that the Son of God became incarnate to demonstrate that the 
Falher is in the Son, the Son in the Father, and the same for the Holy Spirit. In 
Chapter 45, §§ 5-6, Llull argues that the Trinity is better demonstrated by the 
Incarnation than by anything else and in Chapter 49, § 8, contends that the Trin-
ity is more nobly demonstrated to the lower good if there is an Incarnation than 
if thcre is none. He goes on to argue that because of the greatness of the gift 
given to creation by the Incarnation, the gift in the three divine Persons is better 
signified. Llull states here that "la encarnacio demostra que lo Pare dona al Fill, 
e lo Pare e 1 Fill donen al Sant Spirit, sens inperfeccio dc bonea poder & c , e lo 
do es a perfeccio de la bonea poder &c. qui es en la essencia c en les person-
es." 8 9 
" Lectura superArtem inventivam ei Tabulam generalem, MOG V, v, 38 (396); Liberde concordan-
tia et contrarietate, ROL I, 397; Liber de divina voluniate iiijiniia ei ordinata. ROL I, 474. 
" Llibre de demostracions, ORL XV, 411 -3. 
"ftW.,413. 
"lbid., 416. 
"Ibid.. 495-6, 580-1,592. 
mlbid., 592. 
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A furlher indicalion of the Incarnation's demonstration of the Trinity occurs 
in Book IV, Chapler 5, § 4, where Llull explains that this demonstration of the 
inllnite subsistence of the Son of God in the humanity of Christ can only be 
achieved in creation if that crealure (i.e. Christ) is greater in virtue or capacity 
than all other creatures, namely if it is conjoined with the divinity. However in 
§§ 3 and 5 of this same chapter Llull clearly states the complementary and reci-
procal relations existing bctween these two Articles, whereby we see that signi-
fication operates, in fact, in both directions: that which, in his final works, at 
least, is construed as ascent and descent. He even claims in § 3, that just as the 
Trinity is a mirror and demonstration of the lncarnation, so also the Incarnation 
is to the human intellect a mirror and demonstration of the Trinity ("En axf con 
trinitat es mirall e demostracio de la suberana encarnacio, en axf encarnacio es 
al huma enteniment mirall e demoslracio de trinitat."). 9" Again these close rela-
tions between Trinity and Incarnation are reaffirmed in Book IV,'" where Llull 
states that the Trinity, as mirror and demonstration of the Incarnation, offers us 
the means by which the Incarnation can be made clear by necessary reasons, an 
cvidcnt ccho of Book IV, Ch. 8, § 2, where he claims that the Trinity signifies 
the Incarnalion ("con trinitat sia s ignif icacio de la encarnac io del Fill de 
Deu. . . " ) . 
In Book IV, Chapter 10, § 2, while discussing the presence and activity of 
God's great mercy in Himself and in creation, Llull again insists on the fact that 
the Trinity offers a demonstra t ion of the Incarnation ("per asso trinitat es 
demostrable: per la demoslracio de la qual, encarnacio es demoslrable"), and 
proceeds, with relative succinctness, to illustrate the interrelations between these 
two truths.' J 2 Thus in Book IV, Ch. 13, § 1, Llull feels justified in stating defini-
tively that the Trinity and thc Incarnation offer reciprocal demonstrations of 
each other.'" Llull argues, expressing his arguments in the form of demonstra-
tiones per negationem and per hypothesim, that if we can prove thc Trinity, "la 
encarnacio que nos encercam es probable; cor si trinitat es, cove que encarnacio 
sia", thus asserting the necessily of the Incarnation, but reserving commenl with 
respect to the necessity of his proofs.'' 4 What Llull argues, in this particular 
instancc is that if there were a Trinity without an Incarnation, it would bc 
impossible (according to supreme justice and mercy) that these two things, 
" Ibid., 433-4. 
"' Ibid.. 453-4. 
"Ibid, 458-9. 
'" /6(4,471. 
"' Ibid. 457-8. Hames 2000. 28, cunlirms thai "Llulfs understanding of the naturc ol thc Incarnation 
procecded logically from his proof of the Trinity. and if one had accepted the latter, the former became a 
necessity." As this section of my article shows, however, ihe demonstrations or proofs are reciprocal. 
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which would be opposites, should be in thc same failh and law." And in a curi-
ous addendum to his earlier proofs, he adduces both the lack of belief of Jews, 
Muslims, and certain other "infidels" in either of these articles of faith and thc 
belief of Catholics in both, as the reasons why it is fitting by necessity that, if 
there is a Trinity, so must there be an Incarnation ("si trinitas es que encarnacio 
sia"). 
In Disputacio de cinc savis (1294) Llull gives a somcwhat fuller explanalion 
of just how the Incarnation is a mirror image ("mirall e figura") of the Trinity, in 
place of his earlier, simply declarative, statements. 9 6 He states that just as the 
Father and Son and Holy Spirit are convertible by essence and nature, and 
remain one essence, one nature, one deity, one God, yet remain distinct on 
account of their personal properties (such that one Person is not another); so 
also, in the Incarnation, there is a conversion of divine and human natures with-
in a unity of Person, and yet a difference between both remains, insofar as one 
nature is not the other.'" Thus it is not at all surprising that Llull should declare 
that he will use a common means of proving the Trinity and the Incarnation ("E 
car de la sancta trinitat avem donada conexensa, volem-la donar de la sancta 
encarnatio del Fil de Deu, segiient la manera que avem tenguda en significar e 
provar la sancta trinitat de Deu," emphasis added).™ Even in such late works as 
Supplicatio Raymundi (June 1310), and Liber de participatione christianorum 
et saracenorum (July 1312), Llull again uses the same precepts to demonstrate 
both Trinity and Incarnation." 
Echoing and expanding upon his statement of almost twenty years earlier,'"" 
Llull argues in Disputacio de cinc savis that the Incarnation is a mirror in which 
thc human intellect might most perfectly reflect and contemplate the operations 
" Uibre de demostracions, ORL XV, 457-8. 
"" For LlulPs use of mirror iniagery. see Johnston 19%, 51. where he discusses the epistemological 
repercussions of LlulFs theory of resemblance; stating, with regard to the niirror, that il is the "paradig-
matic metaphor for the soul's capacity to receive likenesses." 
'" Disputacid de cinc savis, ATCA 5, 80-81. Though speaking of the deification of man rather than 
Christ. Williams notes that in Aquinas' discussion (Summa theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 3) of the role of the Per-
son of the Father in the Trinity, an analogy is drawn between the relation of the Father to the Son and the 
Father to his adoptive sons (graced creatures), such that "[i]ntra-Trinitarian relations are mirrored in thc 
relation of Uncreated to crcaled, so that even though there are clear differences between the two (i.e., a 
shared nature in one case. the absence of such in another) the similarity enables one to envisage the crea-
ture's gracing as a form of sharing in modes of Trinitarian existence". Williams 1997, 8, leading her to 
conclude that Aquinas "[portrays| the Trinitarian mission as itself an inherently deifying work", ibid., 10. 
" Disputacid de cinc savis. ATCA 5, 157. 
"" Supplicatio Raymundi. ROL VI, 237; Liber de pariicipatione cllristianorum et saracenorum, ROL 
XVI, 248 ff. 
'°° "En axi con trinital es mirall e demostracid de la suberana encamacid, en axi encarnacid es al 
huma enteniment mirall e demostracid de trinitat," Llibre de demostracions, ORL XV. 433-4. 
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of the Trinity, so that this latter be made known."" The reasons for such reilec-
tion of the Trinity by the Incarnation are given as being the lack of mulliplica-
tion or alteration in both; the fact that the Incarnation is the maximum that can 
be received by the created world and the limit of God 's influence on created 
nature; and the fact that in both there is an absence of imperfection (of time, 
place, quantity, motion)." 1 2 
As the years pass, however, Ramon Llull becomes slighlly more circumspect 
in his pronouncements on the relations between the Trinity and the Incarnation, 
reminding the reader in Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem 
(1294-5) that God's self-origination as a Trinity is the supreme end, while the 
Incarnation is simply the end of creation."" And again, much later in his produc-
tion, while wriling Liber cle concordantia et contrarietate (Deccmber 1313), 
Llull states that knowledge of the Trinity is a "sc ien t iam necessar iam ad 
superius" while that of the Incarnation is "ad inferius" and leads to necessary 
subal tern knowledge , s ince the Incarnal ion conta ins con t ingen t e l ements 
("incarnatio sit a contingentia facta")."" This superiority of the Trinity over the 
Incarnation is again reiterated in Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordinata 
(January 1314), where Llull declares that because divine will and perfection are 
infinite and ordinate, they require a lower superlative order ("ordinem superla-
tivum inferius") to match their higher superlative order ("ordinem superlativum 
superius"), "qui ordo superius est a divina trinitate, et ordo inferius est a divina 
incarnatione." 1"' 
Conclusion 
From an early point in his production Llull ascribes a multiplicity of purpos-
es to the Incarnation, among which deification and hominification come lo fca-
ture strongly, in his later writings, as bi-direclional vectors of divine and human 
influence and refluence, respectively; the influence, thal is, of a cause upon its 
"" Disputacid de cinc savis, ATCA 5, 160. 
'"' For a similar set of arguments illustrating how the Inearnation is "imatge e ligura" of ihe operalion 
of G o d s Trinily, see Comenl del Diciat (1299), ORL XIX, 311, eommenlary on the lines "Ab enearnar 
ha Deus mostrat / 1'obra que ha en irinital"; see also Dictali coinmentiim, ROL XIX, 398, II. 219-232. 
"" Lectura super Arlem inveiilivam el Tabulain generalein, MOG V, v, 38 (396). 
"" Liberde ctmcordantia et conlrarietale, ROL I, 397. With regard to the related question of Llulls 
pronouncemenls during his linal works eoncerning the lesser necessity of the Incamation with respect to 
that of the Trinity, Ruiz Simon has pointed out, in personal communications, thal this may simply be the 
result of; a) the evolution of LlulPs methods of demonstration; and b) his awareness of ihe fundamenlal 
difference between freely-willed and natural' acts. 
108 Liberde divina voluntale infinila et ordinata, ROL 1, 474. 
SPECULUM, SIMILITUDE, AND SIGNIEICATION 31 
effect and the refluence of that effect upon its cause.'"* But this creator God of 
Christian revelation, viewed here through a Pseudo-Dionysian tilter, also bears a 
super-abundant and effusive, though freely-given, love towards His creation, a 
love which it is man's principal duty, his first intention, to reciprocate. Although 
God's goodness and love, both internally and externally, are among the principal 
and constant preoccupalions of LlulFs writings throughoul the years, ultimately, 
he does come to speak of the relationship between God and man in terms of the 
highest degree of generality or abstraction (which, in Neoplatonic terms, repre-
sents the closest approximation to pure Being and possesses the highest degree 
of reality). Thus he speaks of God as the superlative cause and of man as His 
created effect; Christ's human nature being the superlative effect, namely, the 
most pcrfect among created beings. He further insists that Christ is not merely 
an effect, however, but, through his dual nature, the very union of cause and 
effect and that, as effect, He is the supreme reflection of his cause. 
Llull, therefore, universalised his arguments and procedures, in an attempt to 
avoid the specificity of doctrines which, in their origin, are differentially Christ-
ian, and explicated the nexus formed by Christ 's Incarnation, that is to say, 
between the uncreated and the created, in terms drawn from the Neoplatonic 
heritage common to the three medieval monotheistic religions. God's externally 
diffusive or creative aspect, in Llull as in other medieval Christian authors, is 
always subordinate to His will, yet is also but one side of His operations; Llull 
also devoted a special place to the consideration of God's internal activities, 
'"" Llibre de contemplacid (1273-4?), 248:20, states that the reasons for the Incamation are: to give 
glory to man, to restore or to recreate the world, and to demonstrale God's Virtues, adding that there are 
many other reasons which would take too long to recount (!). This work is also filled with references to 
thc manner in which Christ. through both his Incarnation and His Passion, offers an example, variously, 
of love, goodness, suffering. and nobility. whereby man can more easily override his sensory powers, 
learn to disdain worldly vanities, become more religious. act virtuously while avoiding vice, and engage 
in prayer and the contemplation of God, thus fulfilling the Lullian "first intention", ibid., 54:11, 13-15; 
123:4; 183:17, 19; 185:10:248:22, 28-29; 338:1-30. Many of these advantages offered by Chrisfs exam-
ple correspond to the express aims of Llulfs first Art, Ars compendiosa inveniendi verilatem (1274?), as 
stated in the Prologue, MOG I. vii, I (433). See also Llibre de demostracions (1274-6) ORL XV, 23, 49-
50, 531-2. In Book IV, chapter 30, § 3, 531-2, LIull stresses the multiplicity of ends of the Incarnation. 
wiihout which there would be but one demonstration for a single purpose and ihe supreme good would 
be deprived of goodness, power, etc. Thus. alongside the manifestation of G o d s Virtues and the recre-
ation of man, Llull cites Chrisf s suffering and death (with regard lo His human nalure). the descent of 
His soul into hcll, and His bodily resurrection (the other Articles of Failh relating lo Chrisfs humanity) 
as lurther purposes of the Incamation. Clearly it is important for Llull to employ his Arts (as these devel-
op) in the discovery of a multiplicity of topics upon which to base multiplc demonstrations of the mulli-
ple purposes of the Incarnation, largely for the reasons of maximity specified in the "conditions" from 
Uibre del genlil e dels ires savis (1274-83). However, we should note that there is a certain degree of 
calibration regarding these multiple purposes, which increascs over time as Llulfs priorities shifl and 
become beiter defined 
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namely His self-origination as a Trinity of Persons and the relation this bears to 
the Incarnation, an Incarnation which casts light both upon God's internal and 
His exlernal diffusiveness. In this way, it appears that the imperative Llull 
imposed upon himself in his efforts to generalise the Arts themselves, applied 
equally to his Christology, in which Christ came to be viewed as the most gen-
eral creature, namely, that Being who has the greatest commonality, and who 
possesses this independently—to a certain degree—from the generality of Orig-
inal Sin. In this way, the Great Arts, in all their generality, and LlulFs Chrislol-
ogy, in all its focus upon the quite different generalily of Christ, became more 
compatible the one with the other as the role of the atonement effected by the 
Incarnation became less of a priority. 
The tension between the movements of descending influence and ascending 
refluence, in effect, finds itself resolved in Christ, through his exemplification 
(as well as, qui te literally, his embodiment ) of the perfect reciprocal love 
between God and man; though it is probable that Llull lends greater emphasis to 
the descending movement of God's influence as supcrlative cause following the 
transitional works of 1287-89, here indicating that not only is man's reditus in 
Deuin Christocentric, but also, and preeminenlly so, the divine exitus a Deo. 
The polarity between God and man, bctwecn the infinite and uncreated and the 
finite and created, therefore—if not entirely dissolved—is, at least, successfully 
mediated by Christ, in whom influence and refluence, deification and hominifi-
cation, find reciprocal repose. 
I also hope to have suggested that the context itself—of LlulFs discourse 
upon causality and, in particular, upon final causality—can, in its own turn, use-
fully be viewed in the light of the fluctuation and calibration of LlulFs language 
about Christ, as well as in thc light of his discourse concerning God's and man's 
purposes as resumed in the ilgure of Christ. For Llul fs understanding of the 
nalure of the Incarnat ion—equally a doctrinal term with apologetic ends, a 
moral example directed at Christians, and an Article of Faith which rcquires 
understanding—helps to create the conditions for a shift in hermeneusis (both 
with regard to any alteralion in his interpretations of the Incarnation themselves 
and changes within the Great Art), a hermeneutic shift which, with respect to 
the Incarnation, does not eliminate the range of possible interpretations, nor ren-
der previous thcorisations obsolete, but rather orders them and adjusts their con-
figuration in accordance with the demands of his priorities at any given point. 
In Llulfs onlo-theological worldview, all reality, from thc lowest—elementa-
tive—level, is alrcady figurative in that il participates in and, lo varying degrees, 
signifies or standsfor its creator. This is not to say, howevcr, that Llull feels no 
need to employ figurative language for purposes of elucidation or instruction. His 
more popular works are filled with analogies, similes, metaphors and compar-
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isons of various types; indeed, his Great Arts base themsclves upon an analogical 
exemplarism in which forms of comparison are drawn from his material logic 
and employed in assessing both beings and truths, that is to say both ens realis 
and ens rationis, according to their position on a scale of parlicipation in or signi-
fication of the divine attributes. He even replaces the combinatoric model of the 
elemental theory, on the basis of which connections had been established analog-
ically between beings, with a model in which the Dignities themselves as well as 
their created manifestations are conceived as rescmblances, between which there 
exist dynamic relations of resemblance; resemblance thus pertains to Being qua 
cause and to beings qua caused and qua causes themselves. 
His use of the language of similitude, likeness or resemblance; of example, 
ligure and image—particularly that of the mirror-image metaphor as the para-
digm case of the signification of likenesses to the soul—supposes an essentialist 
ontology and a realist epistemology, along with an equation between ens realis 
and ens rationis, as a result of which Christ represents not only the very real 
point of return of (corporeal and spiritual) creation to its creator but also that 
example which participates most greatly in the exemplar and towards which 
man is obliged to direct the acts of his memory, intellect and will. This lan-
guage—expressing degrees of identity between being and thought as well as 
between beings themselves—reveals, in divine influence, a degree of God 's 
immanence in reality, a reality which both points towards and strives lo attain its 
end and perfection in the transcendent. The use of such terminology finds its 
apogee in the person of Christ: supremely perfect man, cosmological intermedi-
ary, and embodiment of both God's perfection of purpose and man's highest 
finality. Christ as God man, being that point at which the ontological and thc 
epistemological achieve their most superlative coincidence, and being that per-
son in whom the corporeal body and the intellective soul are most nobly con-
joined, permits the corporeal—through the spiritual and the spiritual through its 
conjunction in him with the divine—to find repose in the Supreme Being. In His 
human nature, Christ signifies man's capacities and aspirations (in particular, 
man 's first intention—a preoccupation, although not exclusively, of L lu l f s 
Quaternary Phase); in His divine nature, He signifies God's final cause in cre-
ation (God's first intention—a preoccupation, although again not exclusively, 
of L lu l f s Ternary Phase) and, both ultimately and super-eminently, God ' s 
internal agency: the Trinity which, while remaining superior to the Incarnation, 
providcs its reflection as in a mirror. 
Liulfs paradigmatic signs are the Trinity and the Incarnation, each signify-
ing the other. The Incarnation is the meaning and purpose of creation as well as 
the sign of the conversion, unity and difference of Persons in thc Trinity (and of 
the conversion, unity and difference of natures in Christ himself), while the 
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Trinily is a sign of itself as self-origination and a sign of its own voluntary, 
benevolent, and loving external diffusiveness. Thus, at the heart of Being, as of 
created being, that is to say, al the heart of that which must be conceivcd to bear 
the greatest resemblance to itself, and to have an infinite degree of self-identity, 
namely, that Being within which there is concordance without contrariety, lies 
difference, though dilference in unity or identity. For Llull, Chrisfs superlative 
reflection or signification of the superlativity of Being, enacts the fullest possi-
ble reduction of contrariely in the relationship between man and God and thc 
fullest possible increase in concordance between them. 
Though the discussion of these Articles of Faith may disappear, relatively 
early, from the Arts themselves, they remain in the background (and throughout 
works in which there is an application of the principles of the Arts) as an emi-
nence blanche, co-ordinating the manoeuvres made in their name. The works 
themselves, Artistic or othcrwise, in which these themes receive consideration, 
contain a multiplicity of arguments, which often have to contend with powerful 
counter-arguments, yet each possesses, both at the macroscopic and the micro-
scopic levels, an identical finality (viz. the demonstration of the Catholic faith lo 
Muslims, Jews, schismatic Christians and Pagans). 1" 7 
So, for Llull, while there can never be any possibility of rcducing religious 
differences to a homogeneous idenlity of belief, there is, at the level of the fun-
damental (shared) presuppositions of the three monotheistic faiths a degree of 
identity, namely those preambula fidei (e.g. the similarity of certain articles of 
the respective faiths, shared Neoplatonic influence and identical cosmologies, 
e t c ) , upon the basis of which, implacably and inexorably, he guides his readers 
towards the incontrovertible conclusions which concur with the differentially 
Christian Articles of Faith (used here as the conclusions to, rather than as 
axioms for arguments). For Llull, however, conflict is indeed open, though, at 
leasl in his early works (e.g. Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis (1274-83)), medi-
ated by the protocols of courtesy and good order. Ultimately, though, he is not 
concerned simply to replace non-Christian (or Eastern Christian) beliefs with 
Latin "orthodoxy," and still less to eradicate any differences in the name of a 
syncretistic fusion; bul rather, by taking cognisance of the beliefs of the "Other," 
he is intent upon leading "infidels" (and Christians alike) towards an undcr-
slanding of the universality and truth of the Catholic faith, by means of methods 
which are, in his eyes, equally universal and equally true. 
Robert D . HUGHES 
"" Again, as Anthony Bonner has noted in a recent article, the mulliplicity of Llulls arguments in 
support of a point of doctrine, indicates a multiplicity of possible roules towards the sanie (Christian) 
Truth See Bonner2003, 57. 
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ABSTRACT 
El tema principal del discurs lull ia sobre la semblanca es 1'encarnacio del 
Crist, especialment aquell punt en que similitud i concordanya entre Deu i home 
son maximes i les seves contraries (diferencia i contrarietat) son mfnimes. El 
Crist es conceptualitzat mitjancant les categories de semblanca i signiticacio en 
funcio de la seva especularitat i proporcionalitat respecte de la Trinitat. En 
caracteritzar el Crist com el nexe i el camf entre Pinfinit i el finit, Llull aconse-
gueix que tota diferencia entre home i Deu no sigui substancial o metaffsica, 
sino accidental, causada pel pecal original i anullada gracies a la deificacio de 
la humanitat que es produeix cn 1'encarnacio del Crist. 
